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This Note surveys recent state laws enacted in response to
unsolicited electronic mail or "spam."' Unsolicited electronic mail is
perceived by many users of the Internet and the Worldwide Web as a
nuisance. Other authors have described the economic incentives for,
and the infrastructural costs associated with, spare. 2 More seriously,
spam may be an obstacle to the success of the Internet economy.3
While the U.S. Congress has been slow to act state legislatures have
been far more responsive. Since the first bill was introduced in the
Copyright © 2000, Max P. Ochoa.
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1. Unsolicited electronic mail is known by many names, including "unsolicited bulk
email," "unsolicited commercial email," or UCE, and spain. In this Note, "unsolicited
electronic mail" and "spar" will be the preferred names.
2. See, e.g., Lisa M. Sternoff, Comment, Taking Spam Out of the American Diet (Feb.
1999) (unpublished comment, text available online at <http://www.lisastemoff.com>); Michael
W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial
Solicitations, 11 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 233, 276 (1996); Barry Bowem, Controlling unsolicited
bulk e-mail: Who's taking action? What's being done? SUNWORLD (Aug. 1997)
<http://www.sunworld.com/swol-08-junkemail.html>.
3. See, e.g., Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users'
Attitudes About Online Privacy, AT&T LABs-RSEARCH TECHNICAL REPORT TR 99.4.3 (Apr.
14, 1999) <http:llwww.research.attcomlprojects/privacystudy> (documenting Internet users'
concerns regarding, inter alia, receiving unsolicited communications as a result of their on-line
activities).
4. As of March 2000, the U.S. Congress is considering nine different bills addressing
unsolicited electronic mail. Eight bills were introduced in the 105th Congress, none of which
became law. For a detailed list of pending legislation, see CAUCE, Coalition Against
Unsolicited Commercial Email (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.cauce.org>.
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Nevada senate in January 1997,1 fourteen states have passed sixteen
laws regulating spain, and four states created committees charged
with addressing a host of Internet related issues, among them, spam.6
In enacting spain legislation, states have adopted a variety of
approaches have been implemented by the states in the new laws,
exemplifying Justice Brandeis' observation that the state may "serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments. ' 7
Nonetheless, general patterns in the enacted legislation are emerging.
Section II of this Note describes these general patterns and highlights
a few notable exceptions from the trends.
As companies strive to get attention on the web, many are
turning to consumers' inboxes.8 In practice, it is difficult for anyone
to know the physical location of the recipient only from an
individual's e-mail address.9 As a result, companies interested in
exploiting the economic efficiencies of unsolicited electronic mail,
but wanting to comply with the various state laws, must comply with
the superset of the various state laws. 0 Section II describes "best
practices" to be used by companies trying to minimize their exposure
under the spain laws.
Section IV describes some shortcomings of the current laws,
both legal (constitutionality and enforceability) and practical
(effectiveness and ease of use by recipients of spain), and makes
suggestions for improvements. Section V presents a very brief
discussion of two recent decisions, one declaring Washington State's
law unconstitutional under the "Dormant Commerce Clause," and
another rejecting a summary judgement motion seeking to declare
Louisiana's statute unconstitutional. Section VI concludes the Note.
5. NEv. REV. STAT. § 41 tit. 3 (1998) (introduced Jan. 1997, enacted July 1997, effective
July 1, 1998).
6. Maine, Maryland, New Jersey and Oregon.
7. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. An "inbox" is the electronic equivalent of a mailbox, where a user may see the
electronic messages, solicited and unsolicited, that have been sent to the e-mail address
associated with that inbox.
9. For example, maxochoa@yahoo.com alone, does not indicate that I am a resident of
the State of California, or of the United States, for that matter.
10. In truth, the problem is far more vexing. As non-U.S. jurisdictions pass legislation
regulating spam, a sender may need to worry about complying with the superset of all laws,
foreign and domestic.
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II. LEITMOTIFS IN STATE LAWS REGULATING SPAM
As of March 3, 2000, fourteen states have passed sixteen laws
regulating spam.12 Additionally, the legislatures of four states 3 have
formed committees charged with exploring legislative approaches to
control spam. A review of the various statutes reveals that there are
certain trends in the legislative efforts to date.
The laws can be divided into explicit unsolicited electronic mall
regulation statutes and consumer protection statutes. Within each of
these two broad categories of laws, there are many elements or
legislative leitmotifs that can be seen at play.
A. Express Unsolicited Electronic Mail Statutes
These are statutes that attempt to define unsolicited commercial
e-mail and to regulate it. A typical definitional scheme is that of
North Carolina: "'Unsolicited' means not addressed to a recipient
with whom the initiator has an existing business or personal
11. Leitmotifs are melodic passages or phrases in music, Wagnerian opera in particular,
that represent a character or emotion. Leitmotif may also refers to a dominant and recurring
theme or pattern, and that is the sense in which it is used in this Note.
12. In order of date of effectiveness of the laws, the states that have enacted spam
regulations are:
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190 (1998) (effective June 11, 1998, as amended by H.B.
1037 (Wash. 1999), declared unconstitutional in State v. Henckel. See Section V, infra. note
40);
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.705-.735 (1998) (effective July 1, 1998);
California, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (1999) and §17538.45 (1999) (both effective
Jan. 1, 1999);
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 46a-6G-1 et seq. (1999) (effective June 11, 1999);
Tennessee, TENN. CODEANN. §§ 47-18-2501, -2502 (1999) (effective June 17, 1999);
Iowa, IOWA CODE § 714D (1999) (effective July 1, 1999);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. Tit. 15, § 776.1 et seq., Tit. 74, § 5060.52 (1999) (effective July 1,
1999);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1, 18.2-152.2, -152.4, -152.12 (1999) (effective July, 1,
1999);
Delaware, DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, §§ 936-941 (1999) (effective July 2, 1999);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-47 (1999) (effective July 8, 1999) and §§ 11-52-1, -6, -4.1
(1999) (effective Oct. 1, 1999);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:73.1(5), (8), (12), (13), 14:73.6 (1999) (effective Aug. 15,
1999);
Connecticut, 1999 Conn. Acts 99-160 (Reg. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1, 1999, also repealing and
substituting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59(b)) CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42 et seq., 52-59(b) (1999)
(effective Oct. 1, 1999)];
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-75A, 14-453, 14-458, 1-539.2a (1999) (effective Dec. 1,
1999);
Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511/1 etseq. (1999) (effective Jan. 1, 2000).
13. See supra note 6.
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relationship and not sent at the request of, or with the express consent
of, the recipient."' 4 "'Commercial electronic mail" means messages
sent and received electronically consisting of commercial advertising
material, the principal purpose of which is to promote the for-profit
sale or lease of goods or services to the recipient."' 5
B. Consumer Protection Statutes
These laws are arguably the easiest with which to comply. In
general, the only requirements on spam are that no misleading subject
lines be used and that the sender of the e-mail not alter or
misrepresent or obfuscate the so-called header (information
describing the route the e-mail has taken through the Internet from
sender to recipient) of the e-mail. The intent of the laws is not to
prevent spam, but rather to make spanmers be "honest" in the subject
lines of their e-mails and for their e-mails to be traceable.
Provided, if one complies with these requirements, one can send
as much spam as one likes. These statutes are generally codified
along with other consumer protection provisions of the particular
state.
C. Additional Legislative Leitmotifs
1. Spam Software Prohibitions
Beginning with Virginia, several states seek to prohibit software
that facilitates spam. 6 Because software can be speech, it is likely
that these provisions of the statutes will be found to violate the First
Amendment. 7
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(10) (1993).
15. N.C. GEIN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb) (1999).
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.4(b) (1999):
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell, give or otherwise distribute
or possess with the intent to sell, give or distribute software which (i) is primarily
designed or produced for the purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification
of electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; (ii) has
only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or
enable the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other
routing information; or (iii) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in facilitating or
enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other
routing information.
17. See Junger v. Daley, 2000 WL 343566, *4 (6th Cir. 2000). Justice Martin wrote:
"Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and
ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment." See
also Bemstein v. U.S. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted,
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2. Long Arm Statutes
While the judicial framework of jurisdiction is being crafted
case-by-case, several state legislatures have attempted to assist
judges' traditional personal jurisdiction analysis by explicitly
amending their long-arm statutes to contemplate the sending of spam
into their state from outside the state." This is an obvious benefit to
plaintiffs, who may be spammed from beyond the borders of their
home state.
3. ISP Safe Harbors
All states which have passed spare laws have created safe
harbors for Internet service providers, or ISPs. ISPs are companies
that provide individuals with connectivity and bandwidth to the
Internet. States have created two forms of ISP safe harbors. The first
is the safe harbor for the transmission of spam. In every state
regulating spam, with the notable exception of Louisiana, an ISP
cannot be held liable for a violation of the spam laws because it
simply transmitted spam-encoding packets. 9 About half the states
have created a second type of safe harbor, shielding ISPs from
liability for attempting to prevent spam.' Left unanswered by the
statutes is the question of vicarious liability of an ISP that knowingly
allows spam to be sent through its servers.
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cit. 1999), where the court found that not even the
Government's strong interest in preventing the proliferation of strong encryption code, surely
more compelling than the state's interest in preventing spam, could limit the free speech
inherent in the creation of software.
18. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT., Tit. 15, § 776.3 (1999): "Transmitting or causing the
transmission of fraudulent electronic mail to or through a computer network of an electronic
mail service provider located in this state shall constitute an act in this state."
19. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46a-6G-3(4) (1999): "No interactive computer service or
public utility will be liable for merely transmitting a bulk electronic mail message on its
network."
20. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46a-6G-3(1)-(3) (1999):
(1) An interactive computer service may block the receipt or transmission
through its service of any bulk electronic mail that it reasonably believes is, or
will be, sent in violation of this article.
(2) An interactive computer service may disconnect or terminate the service of
any person that is in violation of this article.
(3) No interactive computer service may be held liable for any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to block the receipt or transmission through its service of any
bulk electronic mail which it reasonably believes is, or will be, sent in violation
of this article; nor will any interactive computer service be held liable for any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to disconnect or terminate the service of
any person that is in violation of this article.
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4. Civil or Criminal Remedies; Who Can Seek Them?
The states have varied significantly in defining the potential
plaintiff and in choosing whether or not to criminalize a violation of
the spam law. States have variously given rights of action to one or
more of the following: ISPs, individual recipients of the span and the
state attorney generals. Some states have made violations civil
offenses and others have criminalized violations, with the most
flagrant or repeated violations categorized as a felony with prison
terms of several years.
D. Exceptions
Some state statutes do not limit themselves to commercial e-
mails.2' This raises clear constitutionality concerns as government
regulations of non-commercial speech faces stricter scrutiny than does
regulation of commercial speech.22 However, to the extent these laws
are addressing false advertising or fraudulent behavior, and arguably,
the use of misleading subject lines and the misrepresentation of the
origin or routing path of an electronic message constitute such
behavior, the constitutionality question is not reached in the first
instance.
III. "BEST PRACTICES" FOR MINIMIZING EXPOSURE TO STATE SPAM
LAWS
If a sender could somehow know that all her intended unsolicited
electronic mail recipients are in Louisiana, then she only need worry
about complying with the Louisiana statute. As stated in the
introduction, it is very difficult for a sender of an e-mail to know with
any certainty where that e-mail will be received. In effect, an e-mail
21. Virginia, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Connecticut, and Rhode Island's statutes are
illustrative of this point.
22. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment is vast and complex. However,
speaking broadly, the Supreme Court has held that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively unconstitutional and that in order for such restrictions to be upheld, the
government must show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and it
is narrowly tailored to achieve that end, a level of judicial review commonly referred to as strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991). State restrictions on commercial speech are subject to somewhat
greater deference from the courts, though false advertising is not protected by the First
Amendment. After determining if the commercial speech addresses a lawful activity and is not
misleading or fraudulent, a court will uphold a regulation on commercial speech if the regulation
serves a substantial governmental interest, it directly advances that interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve the substantial interest. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of State University of New
York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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sender who desires to comply with, or at least minimize her risk of
violating, the various state spam laws must tailor her messages to
comply with the superset of all the state laws 3 This could be a
daunting challenge. However, because of the general patterns
outlined in Section II, it turns out that the task is manageable. The
following are suggested "best practices" for minimizing one's risk of
violating the state spam laws.24
Do not "spoof" header information. "Spoofing" header
information is a practice used to conceal, obfuscate or misrepresent
the origination point and routing information present in the header of
most e-mail messages. The "header" of an e-mail message is a field
of information found at the beginning or "head" of an e-mail message.
The header identifies the origination point and routing information of
a given e-mail address. By reviewing the header of an e-mail, one
can trace it to its origin. Washington law provides a typical statutory
prohibition:
No person may initiate the transmission... of a commercial
electronic mail message... that uses a third party's Interet
domain name without permission of the third party, or otherwise
misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point
of origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail
message.25
Start subject lines with ADV: or ADV:ADLT. By starting the
subject line of an unsolicited commercial e-mail with "ADV:" (or
"ADV:ADLT" if the subject matter of the e-mail is intended for
persons over 18 years of age), one will avail oneself of a safe harbor
of the California, Tennessee and Rhode Island laws.26
Do not use misleading subject lines.27 An example of a
23. See supra note 10.
24. It should be noted that this area of the law is in heavy flux, and that as new laws are
added by the states or Congress, this advice may change.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020(1)(a) (1998).
26. See, e.g., TENN. CODEANN. §§ 47-18-2501(e) (1999):
In the case of e-mail that consists of unsolicited advertising material for the lease,
sale, rental, gift, offer or other disposition of any realty, goods, services or
extension of credit, the subject line of each and every message shall include
"ADV:" as the first four (4) characters. If these messages contain information
that consists of unsolicited advertising material for the lease, sale, rental, gift
offer, or other disposition of any realty, goods, services, or extension of credit,
that may only be viewed, purchased, rented, leased, or held in possession by an
individual eighteen (18) years of age or older, the subject line of each and every
message shall include "ADV:ADLT" as the first eight (8) characters.
27. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 41-730(l)(c) (1998): "[i1f a person transmits or causes to
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misleading subject line is "Great seeing you last week!". One expects
to receive an enthusiastic e-mail from a friend. Instead, the e-mail is
an unsolicited electronic mail. Arguably if one follows the prior
suggestion, one will automatically comply with this statutory
requirement of many of the laws. An example of an accurate subject
line for a widget-monger might be "We are offering you a one-time
special on widgets."
Establish a valid reply-to e-mail address or toll-free
telephone number.28  One must make it easy and cost-free for a
recipient of one's unsolicited electronic mail to notify one that they
do not wish to receive further e-mails.
Notify recipients of how they can request no further e-
mails.29 The first text in the body of the e-mail should describe the
method that may be used by the recipient to request that no more e-
malls be sent to her.30 This can be a bitter pill to swallow for many
people with sales and marketing responsibilities. They want the
advertisement to be the first thing seen. While many senders of spain
place the information on discontinuing further e-mails at the end of
their messages, they are not complying with the letter of the law.
Do not send further e-mails to people who have requested to
be removed from the distribution list. 31 Senders of unsolicited
electronic mail must set up a mechanism to compare e-mail addresses
be transmitted to a recipient an item of electronic mail that includes an advertisement, the person
is liable to the recipient for civil damages unless the advertisement is readily identifiable as
promotional, or contains a statement providing that it is an advertisement ......
28. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2501(d) (1999): "[Sender shall] establish a toll-
free telephone number or valid sender operated return e-mail address that the recipient of the
unsolicited documents may call or e-mail to notify the sender not to e-mail any further
unsolicited documents."
29. See, e.g., CA. Bus. & PROF. § 17538.4(b) (1999):
All unsolicited faxed or e-mailed documents subject to this section shall include a
statement informing the recipient of the tol-free telephone number that the
recipient may call, or a valid return address to which the recipient may write or e-
mail, as the case may be, notifying the sender not to fax or e-mail the recipient
any further unsolicited documents to the fax number, or numbers, or e-mail
address, or addresses, specified by the recipient. In the case of faxed material,
the statement shall be in at least nine-point type. In the case of e-mail, the
statement shall be the first text in the body of the message and shall be of the
same size as the majority of the text of the message.
30. It should be noted that in the unsolicited facsimile context, some states only require
that this information be provided at the end rather than the beginning of the fax. See id.
31. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2501(c) (1999): "Upon notification by a
recipient of the recipient's request not to receive any further unsolicited faxed or e-mailed
documents, no person or entity conducting business in this state shall fax or cause to be faxed, or
e-mail or cause to be e-mailed, any unsolicited documents to that recipient."
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for subsequent e-mail messages against the e-mail addresses of those
who have previously requested to no longer receive. e-mails. Failure
to do so will give rise to a cause of action under many of the statutes.
Keep up to date with the spare laws. As of March 3, 2000,
Congress is considering nine bills to regulate spam,32 and twenty-five
states are considering new or additional legislation addressing spam.33
Because of the need to comply with the superset of all spam laws, it is
imperative that senders of unsolicited electronic mail that wish to so
comply stay current with legislative developments..
IV. Do THE SPAM LAWS WORK? SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION
If one assumes that state laws are a desirable and effective means
of regulating spam, are the current crop of laws doing the job? If we
answer in the negative, what suggestions might be advanced? One of
the largest problems facing the state statutes looms on the horizon.
As stated in the Introduction, the U.S. Congress is currently
contemplating federal legislation governing spam. As other authors
have pointed out, federal action with regard to spam is desirable.34
However, if the Congress is wise, any legislation that is ultimately
enacted will expressly preempt the state laws we have discussed.
State legislators should also show foresight, as have their peers in
California and Tennessee,35 and include specific language in their
legislation stating that the state laws will terminate when a federal law
is enacted. If either of these two legislative actions does not occur,
spam law will have the same patchwork quilt quality seen in the
unsolicited fax context.36
States should amend their long-arm jurisdiction statutes to
include out-of-state senders of spam into their borders. This will
32. S. 759 106th Cong. (1999), S. 699 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 612 106th Cong. (1999),
H.R. 1685 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 1686 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 1910 106th Cong. (1999),
H.R. 2162 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 3024 106th Cong. (1999), H.R. 3113 106th Cong. (1999).
33. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Virginia. Contact
the author for citations to the various bills.
34. See supra note 2.
35. CA. Bus. & PROF. § 17538.4(i) (1999) and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2501(k)
(1999), respectively.
36. Many states have laws regulating the transmission of unsolicited facsimiles. The
federal government passed a law, 47 USC § 227 (1999), prohibiting unsolicited commercial
facsimiles but did not preempt the state laws. This has created a complicated overlay of
potential state and federal claims which depend on the state of residence of the aggrieved party.
2000]
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facilitate prosecution of spammers and increase the effectiveness of
the laws.
States should consider amending their small claims court statutes
to allow out-of-state senders of spam to be easily served with process,
and sued in small claims court. Additionally, the states should
consider granting small claims courts the ability to grant injunctive
relief in the case of spam prevention. Both of these small claims
court statute modifications will increase the ability of recipients of
spam to avail themselves of the simplest legal forum available
without the complications attendant in superior or municipal courts.
This in turn will enhance the deterrent effect of the laws.
Currently, it is unclear if an ISP that knowingly allows spai to
be sent through its servers can be held liable under a vicarious
liability theory. Since state legislatures have declared the reduction or
eradication of spai desirable, their legislatures should consider the
following suggestions: (1) expressly state that it will be a violation of
the anti-spain law for an ISP to transmit spam with actual knowledge
of such transmission, and (2) require ISPs to install spam-filtering
technology within a reasonable period of time.
States need to do a more thoughtful job of defining what actually
constitutes spai or "bulk" commercial e-mail.37 Under many of the
statutes, the sending of just one e-mail to just one recipient is
spamming. This is probably not the intended result. The only state
attempting to define "bulk" to date is Louisiana, which defines
"unsolicited bulk electronic mail" as any commercial e-mail sent to
more than one thousand recipients.3 1 The obvious problem with this
numerical definition is that many spam-facilitating programs can be
used to send only 999 messages or n-1 messages, where n is the
arbitrary, legislatively decreed numerical threshold defining "bulk" e-
mailing or spam. While quantitative measures are probative, they
should not be dispository. Legislatures should introduce a "totality of
the circumstances" test that encourages a fact-finder to look at the
alleged spammer's behavior in a broader context than just the number
37. The author recognizes that political economy theory contemplates purposeful
ambiguity as the natural result of the inability of political actors to agree to any particular
legislative definition. Because specificity may at times harm one party's vested political interest
or the other or both, but faced with pressure to do something, legislatures have been known to
pass vague laws and let the judiciary sort out the mess.
38. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:73.1(13) (1999). "'Unsolicited bulk electronic mail' means any
electronic message which is developed and distributed in an effort to sell or lease consumer




Finally, even if all these suggested improvements are made, the
problem of spain is not actually solved. Individuals will still get
spain, particularly if a spammer only needs to comply with the
consumer-protection state statutes (no misleading subject lines or
spoofed headers). People will still be frustrated and angered by the
dozens of spain messages they receive each day. What is needed is a
broad adoption by the states, or federal enactment, of a Nevada- and
California-style prohibition on unsolicited commercial e-mails that
requires the senders of the spam to only send e-mail to those
recipients who have expressly opted in to receiving the e-mall. The
opt-in language should have teeth. For example, when a user is first
registering with a site, and she is being asked if she would like to
receive occasional e-mails, the default answer should be "no." Only
an affirmative act of the user should constitute opt-in. Other authors
have described the inherent benefits of a strong opt-in approach for
consumers.
39
V. RECENT COURT DECISIONS
State v. Heckel.40 On March 10, 2000, King County Superior
Court Judge Palmer Robinson ruled that Washington's anti-spam law
is unconstitutional because "the statute in question violates the
Federal Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, [and] that the Washington statute is restrictive and
burdensome. .. ." The 145-word, handwritten decision echoes a
string of cases that have rejected state regulation of Internet activities.
The state attorney general has decided to appeal the decision.
Whether or not any state regulation of the Internet can be legal is
beyond the scope of this Note.41 However, the recent Washington
decision adds urgency to the need for comprehensive, federal
legislation regulating spamn and preempting state law.
Fox v. Reed.42 On March 16, 2000, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted defendants'
motion to dismiss a case brought by plaintiffs engaged in transmitting
39. See generally supra note 2.
40. State v. Heckel, Case No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA (Wa. Super. Ct. 2000).
41. For a competent lay article on the subject, see Carl S. Kaplan, State Internet Laws
Face a Different Constitutional Challenge, NEW YORK TIMES ON THE WEB (visited July 2, 1999)
<http://search.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fastweb?getdoc+site+site+7221 l+44+wAAA+July
%7E2,1999%7Eand%7Einternet>.
42. Fox v. Reed, Civ. Action No. 99-3094 Section: "R"(4), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318
(E.D. La. Mar. 16,2000).
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bulk electronic mail. The defendants were the Attorney General of
the State of Louisiana and the District Attorney for the Parish of St.
Tammany. The plaintiffs facially challenged the constitutionality of
the Louisiana's statute under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
as vague and overbroad, raised the First Amendment rights of free
speech and communication, and challenged the legislation based on
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs
had not in fact been charged or threatened under the statute; rather
they were seeking to have the statute declared void in anticipation of
an actual act.
Ultimately, the decision of the court does not indicate whether or
not the statute would survive Constitutional scrutiny. The court
refused to hear the merits of plaintiffs' case. It dismissed on the basis
that, because plaintiffs had not established the requirements for
standing, the case did not present a justiciable case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution and so lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.43 The court did not address the merits of
plaintiffs' assertions, leaving the door open for plaintiffs to bring their
case before a court with proper jurisdiction.44
VI. CONCLUSION
States have leapt into the breach left by Congress' inability to
agree on an approach to regulating span on the national level.
Fourteen states have already enacted spain laws. At least twenty
additional states are considering their own legislation. Because of the
borderless nature of the Internet and the practical problem of knowing
where a recipient of spam resides, a person interested in minimizing
her exposure to the anti-spam statutes must comply with the superset
of these regulations. This Note analyzed the common themes or
leitmotifs that arise in the statutes and presented suggestions for
compliance with the superset of the laws. I additionally made
suggestions for lawmakers to consider in crafting the new statutes to
address shortcomings in the current laws.
A recent decision has declared Washington's statute
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause, calling into
question the validity of the other regulations. 'For a variety of reasons,
this Note advocates for the prompt enactment of a federal anti-spam
statute that expressly preempts the state laws and incorporates a
43. Id. at *27.
44. Id. at *6.
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strong opt-in requirement. Until such a federal law is enacted, the
uncertainty for plaintiffs and defendants will only increase as new
states increase the roster of spare laws, complicating compliance for
businesses trying to legally use span as part of their marketing
efforts.

